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CrowdCO-OP: Sharing Risks and Rewards in Crowdsourcing
Paid micro-task crowdsourcing has gained in popularity partly due to the increasing need for large-scale
manually labelled datasets which are often used to train and evaluate Artiicial Intelligence systems. Modern
paid crowdsourcing platforms use a piecework approach to rewards, meaning that workers are paid for each
task they complete, given that their work quality is considered suicient by the requester or the platform.
Such an approach creates risks for workers; their work may be rejected without being rewarded, and they
may be working on poorly rewarded tasks, in light of the disproportionate time required to complete them.
As a result, recent research has shown that crowd workers may tend to choose speciic, simple, and familiar
tasks and avoid new requesters to manage these risks.
In this paper, we propose a novel crowdsourcing reward mechanism that allows workers to share these
risks and achieve a standardized hourly wage equal for all participating workers. Reward-focused workers
can thereby take up challenging and complex HITs without bearing the inancial risk of not being rewarded
for completed work. We experimentally compare diferent crowd reward schemes and observe their impact
on worker performance and satisfaction. Our results show that 1) workers clearly perceive the beneits of
the proposed reward scheme, 2) work efectiveness and eiciency are not impacted as compared to those
of the piecework scheme, and 3) the presence of slow workers is limited and does not disrupt the proposed
cooperation-based approaches.
1 INTRODUCTION
Micro-task crowdsourcing as a way to acquire large-scale human input has become increasingly
popular in research, practice, and various businesses. Requesters deploy Human Intelligence Tasks
(HITs) on crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 1 and allocate
monetary rewards to completed HITs. On the other side of the platform, hundreds of workers
self-select tasks that they wish to complete and receive the associated rewards, if requesters accept
their submissions.
Some researchers use micro-task crowdsourcing as a cheap way to obtain high-quality data
quickly [4]. Micro-task crowdsourcing has been used to deploy HITs for a variety of purposes such
as content moderation and metadata annotations [22]. Other studies have employed micro-task
crowdsourcing to design hybrid human-machine methods for improving the quality of machine
learning algorithms [13]. Researchers in the HCI, natural language processing and computer vision
areas have also generally accepted online micro-crowdsourcing platforms to empower innovative
technologies [14, 36, 49]. However, result quality and worker satisfaction are still open research
problems [31].
The development of micro-task crowdsourcing is not only crucial for researchers but also
plays a signiicant role for workers on paid crowdsourcing platforms. According to a survey of
crowd workers on the MTurk and Figure Eight platforms [2], almost 40% of workers reported
crowdsourcing as being their primary source of income, but that this income is usually barely
enough to pay for their daily expenses. Furthermore, Hara et al. [30] showed that the median
1http://www.mturk.com/
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hourly wage for workers on MTurk is only $2 and only 4% of workers achieve more than the US
federal minimum wage of $7.25. Improving crowd workers’ income and worker satisfaction are
essential research challenges as the monetary reward attached to tasks is the primary motivation
for people to complete crowdsourcing tasks [3]. Low average hourly wages exist on crowdsourcing
platforms as there is a very high number of low-reward tasks and workers willing to complete
them [40]. Unpaid work also plays a vital role in decreasing the average wage since working on
rejected or abandoned tasks leads to unrewarded work time [27]. More importantly, workers in
the crowdsourcing market face risks such as unfair rejection and unexpected losses [41, 44]. These
risks not only prevent workers from receiving rewards but also cause the reputation of workers to
decrease [20]. The decrease in the reputation caused by such risks directly afects the opportunity
for these workers to access more paid work in the future.
In this paper, we propose a novel crowdsourcing reward framework that alleviates worker risks
such as unfair and unexpected losses and redistributes rewards across a group of cooperating
workers. In order to observe the impact of diferent reward sharing models, we analyze worker
performance and behaviour across ive distinct experimental conditions in a between-subjects study.
Experiments are carried out on MTurk, which is one of the most popular paid micro-crowdsourcing
platforms. The conditions we study vary based on whether or not the group of workers are exposed
to the proposed reward mechanism, whether or not the monetary incentive is visible to workers
in the group, and whether or not workers can observe the performance of other workers in the
group. The novel reward distribution models we propose and experimentally evaluate in this paper
can provide hourly wages rather than piecework rewards to workers and allow to share the risks
of being rejected or poorly paid by requesters, akin to a mutual insurance company. By centrally
collecting rewards and distributing them proportionally to the time spent completing HITs, it may
even be possible to keep a share of the collected rewards in order to provide crowd workers with
sick and holiday leave as well as other social security services like retirement funds.
Our results conirm that under our novel risk-sharing reward scheme, workers beneit from
several positive efects (e.g., the ability to focus on completing HIT accurately rather than being
as quick as possible to increase their earnings) and requesters obtain result quality levels similar
to traditional piecework reward mechanisms. Additionally, we did not observe the presence of
free-riders; the inluence of slow workers on others’ rewards is also limited. In a post-study survey,
workers reported a deinite interest in participating in cooperative teams with shared risks and
rewards, even with slow workers, further validating the positive perception of our proposed reward
distribution model.
2 RELATED WORK
The design of platforms like MTurk is unbalanced and favours requesters, who can reject inished
tasks without rewarding workers, but can still hold onto the data generated by workers [41].
Preferentially selecting fair requesters to boost earnings and avoiding bad reputation requesters to
avoid risks is becoming progressively crucial for crowd workers. However, poor search interfaces
and inadequate support for workers create a worse work environment [28]. As a result, workers
can only seek mutual help on external websites or tools that can help workers make optimal
decisions [39]. In this section we discuss previous work that aimed at supporting crowd worker
collaboration and at increasing worker-requester trust.
Some tools are utilized by workers to make decisions on which tasks to work on and to intervene
on the existing information asymmetries that exist in crowdsourcing platforms. In 2008, Silberman
and Irani designed and launched Turkopticon: a platform that is employed by MTurk workers
to review requesters. Thanks to a browser extension that aggregates requesters’ review data and
displays the aggregated metrics directly on MTurk, such tool exposes workers to reputation scores
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for a requester before accepting to complete their HITs [47]. One limitation of this approach is that
requesters who make mistakes and receive bad review scores may not be able to access quality
workers in the future. Also, there is no method to control for false reviews.
Callison-Burch developed the Crowd-workers browser plug-in to automatically collect mutual
aid data as workers complete HITs, such as the time it takes for workers to complete tasks and the
reward workers receive [5]. The system then aggregates the collected data and calculates the HIT
average hourly rate, which allows workers to ind high-paying tasks. The results depend on past
data and involving just a few workers would lead to inaccurate measurements. Besides, the lack of
an estimated hourly wage will cause new requests with no previous data to be less attractive for
workers.
In addition to helping workers make HIT choices, some workers self-organize into independent
online communities. For instance, the online forum TurkerNation provides workers with tips and
strategies to work eiciently on MTurk. Ma et al. explored the community side of crowd workers
in online communities and showed that the active participation of workers in these forums reduces
the desire of leaving the crowdsourcing platform [38].
In summary, existing tools and platforms help workers to mitigate risks by avoiding bad tasks and
requesters in the short term. However, these tools have some drawbacks. The irst drawback is that
these mutual aid tools usually have a particular hostility towards the requesters, which may make
the worker-requester trust relationship worse [41]. The second drawback is their vulnerability. For
example, some bad requesters may re-create new accounts to cover up bad reputations while some
new potential good requesters may not be able to attract good workers because of early HIT design
mistakes.
In the long term, such tools may harm the future development of crowdsourcing platforms.
Therefore, a mechanism that can alleviate risks and build trust between requesters and workers
is critical. To support worker-requester trust development, Salehi et al. developed Dynamo, a
platform to support the MTurk community with collective actions. As an example, a campaign that
is called łGuidelines for Academic requestersł in Dynamo successfully involved both workers and
researchers supporting fair treatment of crowd work. However, Dynamo faces barriers for collective
action because of stalling and friction [46]. McInnis et al. provided several practical task design
suggestions to support efective communication between workers and requesters and to mitigate
the risk of unfair rejection [41]. Chang et al. applied some of the design suggestions to decrease
unfair rejections by allowing workers to present their diversity and creativity in the process and to
ofer feedback in later stages [6]. However, this system is limited to data labelling tasks.
Along this line of research, in this paper, we develop a diferent mechanism to foster mutual
trust. First of all, substantial research focused on unfair rejection, studying how unfair rejection
negatively impacts workers’ performance [20, 25, 41]. However, unfair rejection is only part of the
risks that workers face in the micro-task crowdsourcing market. We study the nature of risks from
quality control mechanisms, unfair rejection and traditional piece work reward schemes.
We allocate workers into a group that share risks, including rejection and poorly paid HITs,
among group members. While workers avoid bad requesters and HITs thought external websites
or tools, these methods build a barrier for new requesters. Those optimizations may lead workers
to pay less attention to the quality of their work and more on how to make money with less efort
in a short time [7]. Our alternative reward mechanism allows workers to concentrate their eforts
on completing tasks efectively rather than eiciently. Co-op reward schemes remove the pressure
on workers to work eiciently and complete the task as quickly as possible to get as much reward
as possible as typically done for piecework reward schemes. Our method also encourages workers
to try new and diferent high-risk tasks. Even reward-motivated workers can take up impressive,
possibly challenging and complex HITs without worrying about the associated risks.
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3 WORKERS’ RISKS AND REWARD DISTRIBUTION MODELS
In this section, we irst discuss the risks that workers frequently encounter in the micro-task crowd-
sourcingmarket.We then introduce novel reward distributionmodels which we then experimentally
evaluate together with crowd workers in Section 5.
3.1 Risks Generated by Requesters
Requesters may reject workers’ job due to bad quality, but some work may be rejected unfairly [29,
41, 44]. Prior work showed that some requesters reject work deliberately without a justiiable
reason [41]. Moreover, technical errors made by requesters may cause task submission to fail thus
leading to abandonment and unrewarded work time. Requesters on a micro-task crowdsourcing
platform need to design their tasks. However, some requesters lack experience, so tasks may not be
well designed or may have confusing instructions [24]. Such poor design increases the di culty of
the task, sometimes causing workers to give up halfway [27]. These risks not only prevent workers
from receiving rewards but also cause workers’ reputation to decrease. This directly afects the
opportunity for these workers to access more tasks in the future.
Requesters improve the quality of crowd work by employing external quality control methods
such as pre-screening questions or gold questions (i.e., tasks with veriiable answers) to monitor and
ilter out malicious workers [12, 48]. The use of gold questions, if designed poorly, can increase the
chance of mistakes and can have detrimental efects on workers. For instance, some instructional
attention check questions are complicated to understand for workers and result in unintentional
mistakes [23]. We observed also in our experiment that workers sometimes missed attention check
question, but the remainder of their work in the batch was still valuable and of good quality. This
unpaid work not only decreases the average wage but also hurts workers’ motivation. A recent
study has also shown that workers who receive rejection exhibit negative emotional reactions [20].
3.2 Risks Generated by Platforms
Requesters on a crowdsourcing platform typically set the payment for each HIT. They usually
follow two methods to determine the HIT reward. The irst is based on market pricing, adapting
the reward to similar HITs running on the same platform. For example, information inding tasks
on MTurk are often paid $0.02 or $0.03 per HIT, but sometimes the task could take up to 5 minutes
to complete [13]. A diferent approach to set rewards is based on the time needed to complete
the HIT through rapid prototyping [8]. Requesters complete HITs or publish a sample of HITs on
MTurk to estimate how long it takes to complete. Next, the reward for each HIT is calculated based
on a set hourly wage (e.g., the requester’s country minimum wage). Once the requester has set
the individual HIT reward, the total reward that workers receive is computed considering the sum
of the rewards allocated to all the HITs the worker has completed on the platform. Recently, by
adding a line of script to task HTML on MTurk, Whiting et al. [51] introduced Fair Work to enable
workers to self report task duration and then automatically pay minimum wage to workers. Even if
requesters set HIT rewards based on a minimum hourly wage, the traditional piecework reward
model comes with risks. Questions have diferent inherent di culty levels, so various tasks in the
same batch may take diferent amounts of time to complete. For example, workers who need to
annotate images of machinery components with model information may face varying levels of
task di culty based on the camera angle and clarity of each image. Some may be very blurred,
leading to workers being unable to provide suicient or accurate information. This situation goes
against the fairness of piecework reward schemes. A higher level of task di culty leads to lower
worker accuracy and longer task completion time. In the case of the traditional reward distribution
methods (called Baseline in our experiments), HITs of diferent di culties that are bundled together
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in a batch can have an adverse efect on worker motivation. This is due to the varying amount of
time required for task completion despite the associated reward being the same across all HITs.
Most current crowdsourcing platforms collect workers’ historical performancemetrics tomeasure
the workers’ reliability. Requesters can pre-select workers by setting a threshold on the historical
acceptance rate. In order to keep a good track record, workers start to pick easy and familiar tasks.
This creates a new risk for workers as they lose the chance to learn a new skill. All of these cases
increase the risk for workers to be underpaid or not paid at all in case of rejection. Those risks are
inevitable as the platforms create them. However, the novel reward distribution models that we
introduce in this paper aims at sharing those risks across team members of a group.
3.3 Reward Distribution Model
We propose a novel crowdsourcing reward mechanism that adds participating workers into a co-op
group to share risks. The reward that workers in the group receive is computed considering the
sum of the rewards allocated to the HITs workers in the group had completed. According to co-op
payments, individual workers are paid based on the amount of time that they spent completing
HITs. The entire co-op group earnings are thus redistributed among its members in proportion
to the time they spent on HITs. This allows workers to share the risks of working on poorly paid
HITs and makes the hourly wage the same for all members of the co-op group.
Comparing the piecework and co-op reward schemes, we can observe how the individual
optimization approach aiming at completing HITs quickly to increase the personal hourly wage
disappears in the proposed co-op reward scheme where workers can focus on producing accurate
labels for requesters without worrying about single HIT reward. At the same time, missed reward
due to rejection can be avoided by sharing the loss among group members, thereby diluting the
impact originally put on individual workers whose work has been rejected. Eicient crowd workers
who contribute most reward to the group will cover for less experienced workers who may be
initially slower or less accurate in completing HITs.
4 METHOD AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
4.1 Study Design
Table 1. Diferent reward distribution conditions.
Shared Reward Visible Incentive Social Comparison
Baseline ✗ ✓ ✗
HidIn ✗ ✗ ✗
CooVi ✓ ✓ ✗
CooHi ✓ ✗ ✗
CooHiSo ✓ ✗ ✓
In order to observe the impact of diferent reward sharing models, we collect and analyze worker
behavior and performance data across ive diferent reward distribution conditions. Table 1 presents
the variations across the diferent conditions.
Piecework with Visible Incentive (Baseline). Workers are asked to complete HITs on an external
platform we developed to be similar to MTurk where the reward and the number of available HITs
are displayed on the task list page. Under this condition, workers are paid on a piecework basis like
on MTurk and are free to pick which HIT batch from the list of available HITs they want to work
on. The total reward that they will receive is updated after each completed HIT and is displayed on
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the page. This condition mirrors the traditional piecework reward model, and there is no risk and
reward sharing among workers.
Piecework with Hidden Incentive (HidIn). Under this condition, the reward and batch size for HITs
are hidden in the task list page. Therefore, workers select HITs to complete based on their own
interest rather than on the reward attached to them. Workers are still rewarded on a piecework
basis.
Co-operative with Visible Incentive (CooVi). Under this condition, the reward that workers receive is
based on the amount of time they spent completing HITs as explained in Section 3.3. The entire
co-op group earnings are redistributed among its members in proportion to the time spent. The
reward allocated to individual HITs and the HIT batch size are visible to workers.
Co-operative with Hidden Incentive (CooHi). Under this condition, the reward-sharing scheme is the
same as in the CooVi condition, except that the individual HIT reward and the HIT batch size are
not visible in the task list page.
The combination of Baseline, HidIn,CooVi and CooHi consists of a 2 x 2 factorial design to test
the efect of reward-sharing and the efect of visible reward information on workers’ performance.
It also examines the interaction efect of these variables. For example, it determines whether the
reward-sharing scheme inluence workers’ performance when they choose tasks according to their
interests instead of the reward level. Overall, there are three hypotheses we aim to test with such
design.
Null Hypothesis 1. Workers’ performance is not afected by using a reward-sharing scheme.
Null Hypothesis 2. Workers’ performance is not afected by reward transparency.
Null Hypothesis 3. There is no interaction efect between reward-sharing and visible incentives.
Co-operative with Hidden Incentive and Social Comparison (CooHiSo). We add one experimental
condition to additionally investigate how the visibility of other group members’ performance
afects worker behavior in a co-operative setting without visible rewards. Festinger introduced the
theory of social comparison in 1954, which describes people’s self-evaluation done in the absence
of objective means (hidden incentive, in our case) by comparing their attitudes, abilities and beliefs
with others [19]. The reward-sharing scheme and invisible incentive condition are the same as in
CooHi, except that the hourly wage of other workers in the group is also displayed on the page to
serve as means for social comparison. The results from CooHi and CooHiSo can be used to test the
following hypothesis.
Null Hypothesis 4. The existence of social comparison does not afect workers’ performance when
HIT information is not transparent in a co-operative setting.
4.2 Experimental Setup
We leveraged the MTurk API in a similar way to TurkPrime [37] to build an online crowdsourcing
platform called CrowdCO-OP. Figure 1 shows a sketch of our method. CrowdCO-OP is similar to
MTurk and TurkPrime but for the type of reward distribution and reward information presented
to workers over the user interface which can be controlled across diferent conditions. Unlike
TurkPrime, we only recruit participants and send rewards through the MTurk platform in the form
of bonuses. Other functions, such as task design and worker responses, are completely independent
from the MTurk platform. The corresponding data (i.e., behavioural logs and task answers) is
entirely stored in a separate database on a dedicated server.
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Fig. 1. Overview of CrowdCO-OP: (1) workers are recruited fromMTurk; (2) Workers are redirect to CrowdCO-
OP; (3) Workers select and finish tasks on CrowdCO-OP; (4) the rewards allocated to completed HITs are
collected into a money pool; (5) the rewards are redistributed to worker based on work time.
Fig. 2. Screenshot of the task list page on CrowdCO-OP: (1) information about other group members’
performance; (2) reward and batch size for HITs; (3) feedback form.
We published ive HIT batches on MTurk representing the ive diferent reward distribution con-
ditions presented in study design, and recruited 50 distinct workers in each condition. Participating
workers were limited to the US population since Difallah et al. showed how in recent years, US-only
HITs occupied the largest share of the MTurk market in terms of quantity and incentives [13]. To
prevent biases due to learning efects, workers were not allowed to participate in more than one
condition. Additionally, the IP addresses of workers were logged to prevent workers using multiple
accounts. In each HIT, workers were irst asked to complete a demographics questionnaire with
questions about their gender, age, education and political views. After submitting the questionnaire,
workers were redirected to CrowdCO-OP where they could select HITs to complete from the task
list page. On completing the survey, workers received a completion code that they could use to
submit the HIT on MTurk. The submitted task was automatically approved when a valid code was
entered.
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On CrowdCO-OP, workers in all conditions are irst presented with a page that is similar to the
available task list page on MTurk. Figure 2 shows the task list page on CrowdCO-OP. For each HIT
batch, they can see a title and a description of the task, the reward attached to the HIT, and the
batch size. Metrics about the performance of other workers in the group were only available in
CooHiSo. Workers could freely interact with the HITs, preview them, and decide which ones to
work on. Workers were allocated a maximum of six minutes to complete each of the tasks and
there was no penalty for abandoning.
The rewards earned by workers on our external CrowdCO-OP platform are sent to them as a
bonus on MTurk within 24 hours from the completion of their work session. Workers were also
informed about the possibility of returning to the list of tasks available to them anytime during the
following days (up to a maximum of 20 days) by using their personal URL which identiies them on
CrowdCO-OP.
4.3 Onboarding Workers
While involving MTurk workers in co-op groups, a key aspect is explaining them how they will be
rewarded for their work towards completing HITs. This allows them to be aware of the implications
of risk and reward sharing and impacts the way in which they approach HIT completion. While,
on the one hand, workers aware of participating to a co-op group can take the necessary time to
complete HITs accurately, on the other hand, some may leverage the cooperative reward scheme
setup to be paid without being productive (i.e., free-riders). Note, however, that this is not diferent
from workplaces that require employees to clock in and out and are paid accordingly to the hours
they worked. Such employees when being unproductive face work appraisal processes which may
lead to their contract being ended. While we look at the presence and impact of free-riding in this
paper, we envision a similar approach being possible to deal with free-riding in co-op groups.
In our experiment, we recruited workers from MTurk, presented them with an explanation
including examples customized for the diferent condition they were assigned to, and paid them
the accrued reward as a bonus on MTurk. Before starting the experiment, workers have provided
informed consent to the study. The ive recruitment HITs (one per condition) have been posted on
the MTurk platform, and workers could choose whether to participate in the experiment or not
after being explained the experimental conditions. However, when a worker agreed to join one
experimental condition, they were not be able to accept the HIT for the other four experimental
conditions. In the end, the total reward that workers received was $0.01 allocated to the recruitment
tasks posted on MTurk plus the reward based on the tasks they did on CrowdCO-OP sent to them
via a bonus on MTurk.
4.4 Tasks Design
To simulate the diverse types of HITs available on the MTurk platform, we deployed several task
types including Content Creation (CC), Information Finding (IF), Interpretation and Analysis (IA)
and Veriication and Validation (VV) tasks [13]. Each batch contained tasks with varying complexity,
wherein some tasks required relatively more time to complete and workers had a higher risk of
committing errors. However, replicating MTurk, every task within a batch was associated with the
same monetary reward. The batches of HITs on the task list page, as well as individual tasks within
the batch were randomized to avoid bias due to ordering efects. The HIT batches workers were
presented with on CrowdCO-OP are described below.
Information Finding Tasks (IF). Workers were asked to ind the middle name of 5 given people.
These tasks had three levels of di culty, and with the increasing level of di culty, workers
needed to consider an additional constraint in the information inding process. In the simplest
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Table 2. Diferent batches of HITs that workers were presented with across all conditions.
Task Type Units per HIT HITs per Batch HIT Reward
Information Finding [21] 5 24 $0.15
CAPTCHAs [21] 5 8 $0.05
Entity Resolution [50] 5 50 $0.1
Relevance Judgment [16] 1 50 $0.05
Review Classiication [9] 5 20 $0.1
task, the workers only needed to ind the middle name of a unique celebrity. At the second level
of di culty, workers needed to consider the profession of the person to disambiguate between
several individuals with the same name. In the third level of di culty, workers needed to deal with
two steps of disambiguation to determine the middle name of the person they were looking for;
according to the year in which the person was active in the given profession.
Transcribing CAPTCHA Images (TCI).Workers were asked to decipher characters from ive given
images. These tasks had a diferent level of di culty depending on the number of strokes that were
used to smudge the CAPTCHA. Less interfered images could be transcribed more easily than other
images.
Entity Resolution (ER). For each pair of products, workers needed to verify whether they referred to
the same product or not. The information of the product was integrated from two diferent sources
and each record had two attributes: name and price.
Topic Relevance Judgment (TRJ).Workers needed to read one document to determine whether it
was relevant to the given topic. The topic was, łbirth rates are falling in other countries besides the
United States and Chinaž. For example, a document was relevant to the topic because it described
that Japan had lower birth rates than in the past.
Review Classiication (RC). Workers were presented with ive reviews related to fashion items and
they needed to classify reviews into one of the following three classes: size issue, it issue, and no
issue with size or it. The irst category pertained to negative feedback on the size, in comparison
to the normal size. The second category was about comfort. The last category corresponded to
feedback which had nothing to do with either size or it.
5 RESULTS
The recruiting tasks for each group were published on the MTurk platform between March 2019
and April 2019. 250 workers submitted valid completion codes and completed at least one HIT on
CrowdCO-OP. As described earlier, all workers had 20 days to carry out a maximum of 152 HITs on
CrowdCO-OP after accepting the task on MTurk. In total 13’084 HITs were completed by workers
on CrowdCO-OP, while 51’734 answers and 78’470 log records of worker activities were collected
from 250 workers. On average, every worker completed 52.33 HITs (SD=54.70; median=25) and
spent 3’682.84 seconds (SD=4571.51; median=1707.00) on our platform.
Table 3 summarizes the demographic information reported by workers. Workers across the
diferent conditions share some demographic characteristics. Workers across all conditions were
mainly between 30 and 40 years old, well-educated and earning less than $50,000 a year. We note
small gender diferences in the Baseline, CooHiSo and CooVi conditions, but HidIn and CooHi are
dominated by more than 70% female workers. The proportion of married workers in all conditions
except HidIn is also similar at about 40%. Above 30% of the workers identify their political view as
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Table 3. Worker demographics for each condition.
Baseline HidIn CooHi CooHiSo CooVi
Median Age 33 32 33 37 34
% Female 52% 70% 76% 52% 54%
% Went College 70% 78% 72% 70% 64%
% Married 40% 28% 42% 40% 40%
% Democrat 52% 44% 34% 30% 32%
% Income
Under $50,000
54% 56% 48% 50% 54%
% Political View
as Moderate
30% 44% 34% 40% 30%
% MTurk Exp
Under 6 Months
36% 50% 44% 40% 64%
Table 4. Overall worker performance across all groups.
Baseline HidIn CooHi CooHiSo CooVi
# HITs 3688 1844 1519 2577 3456
# Tasks 14851 7140 6316 9926 13501
Accuracy 82.83% 82.93% 85.12% 81.96% 86.77%
moderate and over half of the workers in the Baseline condition self-report as Democrats. CooVi
and HidIn have a large number of novice workers; about 64% of workers in CooVi and half of the
workers in HidIn have less than six months experience on the MTurk platform. Interestingly, we
also note that the majority of workers in co-op reward groups were liberal despite the onboarding
activity (where we explain how the reward mechanism works) was done before the demographics
questionnaire and workers could still decide not to participate.
As the demographic diversity in each group may afect the experimental results, we ran Spear-
man’s rank-order correlation tests to assess the correlation between worker demographics and
performance metrics such as the number of completed HITs, the accuracy rate, and the average
HIT completion time. All Spearman correlation coeicients shown to be very low showing that
correlations between demographic variables and workers’ performance are negligible. Therefore,
we can ignore the association between worker demographics and experiment results.
5.1 Do Diferent Reward Allocation and Visibility Schemes Influence Workers’
Performance?
Table 4 shows the overall worker performance under each condition. It is clear that the number of
HITs completed by the workers in the Baseline and the CooVi groups were signiicantly higher than
others (3’688 and 3’456 respectively), whereas workers in the HidIn completed the least number
of tasks. We investigated Null Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 based on the number of HITs completed
by workers. To this end, an aligned ranks transformation ANOVA (ART ANOVA) test [53] was
conducted due to the non-normally distributed data and the existence of outliers. The interaction
efect between Shared Reward and Visible Incentive in the number of HITs was not statistically
signiicant, � (1, 195) = 0.342, � = .559, partial �2 = .002. Therefore, an analysis of the main efect for
Visible Incentive was performed, which indicated that the main efect was statistically signiicant,
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� (1, 195) = 34.35, � < .001, partial �2 = .15. We run a post-hoc pairwise comparison with Tukey
adjustment. The marginal means for the number of HITs were 78.1 ± 5.3 for the Hidden Incentive
and 122.1± 5.33 for the Visible Incentive, a statistically signiicant mean diference of 44.1, � < .001.
This post-hoc analysis shows that workers who were shown the associated HIT reward and the
number of available HITs (in the Baseline and CooVi) completed more HITs than workers without
visible incentives (in the CooHi and HidIn). Furthermore, the main efect of reward-sharing in the
number of HITs was not statistically signiicant, � (1, 195) = 0.007, � = .933, partial �2 = .00003.
So, independently on whether information about HITs is presented to workers or not, the number
of HITs completed by workers in groups using the co-op reward distribution method was not
signiicantly diferent.
We also looked at worker accuracy rates in relation to our main hypotheses. Table 4 shows that
workers in CooVi exhibit the highest average accuracy rate of 86.74% while workers in CooHiSo
have the lowest average accuracy rate of 81.91%. An ART ANOVA test was carried out to test null
hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 based on accuracy due to the non-normally distributed data. All three null
hypotheses were accepted due to a lack of statistical signiicance. for shared reward, � (1, 195) = 0.85,
� = 0.358; for visible incentive, � (1, 195) = 3.559, � = 0.06; and for interaction efects, � (1, 195) =
2.036, � = 0.155. Therefore, although CooVi showed to result into better overall accuracy, there was
no statistically signiicant diference in accuracy across interventions. This shows how the diferent
reward schemes had no impact on the quality of labels generated by the crowd. Speciically, co-op
reward sharing mechanisms do not decrease the quality of crowd work despite the beneits they
bring to workers in terms of risk management.
By comparing quantity and quality in the CooHi and CooHiSo conditions using Mann-Whitney
U tests, we found that all diferences were not signiicantly signiicant (� = 1518, � = −1.849,
� = 0.064 and � = 1314.5, � = 0.658, � = 0.51, respectively ). Therefore, Null Hypothesis 4 is
not rejected. Under reward-sharing conditions, the use of social comparison does not afect the
workers’ performance when HIT information is not transparent.
Key Findings. First, workers completed more tasks when they were presented with more
information about HITs, regardless of whether they shared their rewards or not. This means that
visible rewards and platform transparency play a signiicant role in encouraging workers to inish
more tasks. The diferent reward and risk sharing schemes did not have a signiicant impact on
the number of tasks completed by workers. This suggests that the proposed reward distribution
methods can create a win-win situation; workers’ risks are reduced, and their enthusiasm to
complete tasks is not afected (thus beneiting requesters).
5.2 Do Diferent Reward Distribution and Visibility Schemes Influence Worker
Performance Over Time?
We analyzed how workers approached the HITs across the 5 conditions. Figure 3 illustrates the
number of inished HITs and number of workers across the diferent conditions over 20 days.
Dates were normalized according to the initial task acceptance time of each participating worker
on MTurk. For instance, after a worker accepted the HIT that was released through the MTurk
platform, the tasks completed on our platform over the next 24 hours were counted as the HITs
completed on their irst day. Interestingly, we found that most workers completed a large number
of HITs on the CrowdCO-OP platform on their irst day.
In this section, the data of dependent variables for each group of independent variables are
not normally distributed, and the interaction efect is not considered. So we ran all combinations
of factor levels as one factor non-parametric test with ive levels to facilitate making the group
comparisons over days. Table 5 provides � values of Kruskal-Wallis H Tests in comparing worker
performance and average HIT duration (AHD) across ive groups over 20 days. We merged data
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Fig. 3. Number of submited HITs and workers across diferent conditions over 20 days.
Table 5. �-values of Kruskal-Wallis H Tests in worker performance and average HIT duration (AHD) across
all groups over 20 days
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6-20
# HITs < 0.001 0.144 0.011 0.186 0.382 0.024
Accuracy 0.556 0.462 0.213 0.101 0.304 0.442
AHD 0.174 0.27 0.065 0.995 0.979 0.121
Null hypothesis: There were no diferences in worker performance
between groups that difered in reward distribution and visibility
schemes
from the 6th day to the 20th day because active workers reduced dramatically after the 5th day.
From Table 5, we can observe statistically signiicant diferences in the number of HITs completed
on their irst day (�2 (4) = 24.257, � < .001), third day (�2 (4) = 13.144, � = 0.011) and during the
last few days (�2 (4) = 11.265, � = 0.024) across ive groups. On the other hand, the null hypothesis
is not rejected for the accuracy and AHD.
Some interesting observations can be made based on the post-hoc analysis with a Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons. First, statistical diferences in the number of HITS completed
on the irst day across conditions followed the same pattern as the overall performance. This
post hoc analysis exposed statistically signiicant diferences in the number of completed HITs
between CooHi (mean rank=101.10) and CooVi (mean rank=143.13); � = .036, CooHi and Baseline
(mean rank=157.61); � = .001, HidIn (mean rank=105.79) and Baseline; � = .003, but not between
any other condition combination. Workers in the Baseline (2’365 HITs) and CooVi (1’761 HITs)
conditions completed a higher number of tasks on the irst day than workers in HidIn, CooHi and
CooHiSo (1’166 HITs, 848 HITs and 1’135 HITs respectively). This suggests that the visible incentives
associated with HITs in the Baseline and CooVi conditions spurred workers to complete more tasks
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on the irst day. This is likely due to the familiarity of workers with the piecework model and with
visible incentives.
However, this pattern was not observed in the following days and diferences in the number of
completed HITs only existed on the third day between CooHi (mean rank=6.50) and HidIn (mean
rank=31.17 ), � = .005. This happens as workers seem to still prefer the traditional reward model
when reward information is not visible. Moreover, the post hoc analysis on the last few days
revealed statistically signiicant diferences in the number of completed HITs between CooHi (mean
rank=35.61) and CooVi (mean rank=60.27 ), � = .027, but not between other group combinations. In
the long run, the impact of reward information transparency was weak in the traditional reward
distribution model but it still played an important role in the reward-sharing schema.
We found that the co-op groups that shared rewards and risks had more active workers during
last 10 days of the experiment as compared to workers in conditions where rewards were not
shared. For example, during the last 10 days, 16 active workers in CooHi returned to our platform
using their personal link to complete more HITs, but only 3 workers did so in HidIn. While 21
workers in CooVi returned, only 5 workers did so in Baseline. This suggests that with the same HIT
information being visible, the strategy of sharing rewards and risks among a group of workers
motivated more workers to return to HIT batches than in the traditional piecework reward method.
Key Findings.We found that workers were quick to accept our new CrowdCO-OP platform, but
were skeptical about the reward distribution models and hidden incentives early in the experiment.
In the long run, the impact of information transparency was weak in the traditional reward
distribution model but still played an important role in the reward-sharing schema as reward-
sharing made income assessment more challenging. We also found that co-op reward schemes
better incentivizes workers to return to the platform over time.
5.3 Do Reward-Sharing Workers Put More Efort on Completing Tasks Accurately?
We analyzed the impact of task type on HIT completion across the diferent conditions. The most
popular task type on average is Transcribing CAPTCHA Images (TCI); about six-in-ten (57.7%) of
the available TCI HITs were inished by workers in 20 days, compared to 35.48% of Information-
Finding (IF) tasks, 31.45% of Entity Resolution (ER) tasks, 27.44% of Topic Relevance Judgment
(TRJ) tasks and roughly half (51.3%) of Review Classiication (RC) tasks. On the contrary, the least
popular task type was TRJ.
Table 6 shows a comparison of the number of workers who chose a particular type of task as
their irst HIT across the 5 conditions. We found that a majority of workers in CrowdCO-OP chose
to attempt IF tasks (107) and TCI tasks (84) irst, while entity resolution tasks (8) were the least
preferred choice2. Workers across the diferent conditions exhibited similar preferences among the
task types, prioritizing IF and TCI tasks.
More workers chose IF as their irst task than TCI, but TCI was the most popular. Assuming
workers select HITs based on interest, an explanation of this result is that workers can transcript
CAPTCHA from images without additional information, but IF tasks require web search skills and
abstract thinking. Besides this, we conclude that batch size is not another factor inluencing the
choice of irst task as information about the batch size is not available in HidIn, CooHi and CooHiSo
but those group display the same phenomenon.
Table 7 shows accuracy and task completion time across task types and conditions. We observe
that the average HIT completion time of CooVi was longer than that of Baseline except for TCI
tasks while the overall accuracy rate of answers from CooVi was higher than the accuracy rate
of Baseline. We used Mann-Whitney U tests to check whether those diferences were signiicant.
2Note that we randomized the order of HIT batches presented in the initial task list page across workers.
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Table 6. Number of times a task has been chosen first by a worker across the diferent conditions.
IF TCI ER TRJ RC
Baseline 20 15 4 3 8
HidIn 23 16 1 6 4
CooHi 22 14 1 4 9
CooHiSo 20 17 1 7 5
CooVi 22 22 1 2 3
Overall 107 84 8 22 29
Table 7. Accuracy and average completion time per HIT across the diferent task types.
IF TCI ER TRJ RC
Accuracy
(%)
Avg. Time
Per HIT
Accuracy
(%)
Avg. Time
Per HIT
Accuracy
(%)
Avg. Time
Per HIT
Accuracy
(%)
Avg. Time
Per HIT
Accuracy
(%)
Avg. Time
Per HIT
Baseline 76.04 127.91 70.77 43.60 80.16 47.56 75.55 35.54 93.89 51.03
HidIn 81.42 157.13 75.15 43.43 83.07 50.40 73.29 42.82 90.93 50.69
CooHi 82.44 150.49 73.41 51.66 84.71 48.31 74.34 41.83 95.00 54.01
CooHiSo 74.00 183.83 70.20 51.76 80.25 82.49 78.03 74.29 96.12 64.71
CooVi 86.56 151.90 72.47 44.33 84.62 56.30 77.28 43.53 96.70 51.68
Average 80.09 154.25 72.40 46.96 82.56 57.01 75.70 47.60 94.53 54.42
Table 8. The Mann-Whitney U tests in accuracy and task completion time between Baseline and CooVi.
Avg Time Per HIT Accuracy
� � � value � � � value
IF 117 -3.526 .000 125.5 -3.352 .001
TCI 32 .000 1.000 27 -.525 .600
ER 577 -4.640 .000 859.5 -2.692 .007
TRJ 970 -1.930 .054 1119 -.904 .366
RC 193 -.189 .850 83.5 -3.155 .002
Null hypothesis: There were no diferences in accuracy
and task completion time between Baseline and CooVi.
Results are displayed in Table 8. For IF and ER, workers in CooVi (mean rank=31.63 and 63.96) have
longer average HIT completion time per HIT than workers in Baseline (mean rank=17.38 and 37.04),
� < 0.001 and � < 0.001 respectively.
IF and ER tasks are more complicated and require more work. For example, workers need to
retrieve information from the internet, and only then they can answer questions. More efort to
search the web for information will lead to more accurate answers. As a result, we found that for
the IF, ER, and RC task types, workers from CooVi (mean rank=31.27, 58.31 and 26.33 respectively)
have higher accuracy than worker from Baseline (mean rank=17.73, 42.69 and 14.68, respectively),
� = 0.001, � = 0.007, � = 0.002 respectively. The performance of CooVi group workers in the IF,
ER and RC task was better than Baseline. When the visible incentive is available, workers in the
reward-sharing groups put more efort (longer average HIT completion time) into IF and ER tasks.
This can be explained by the fact that the distribution of income is related to the time spent on
tasks rather than the number of tasks completed. It is worth noting that CooHiSo has the opposite
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Table 9. The number of workers with unusually short task completion time (less than one second), the number
of corresponding tasks and overall accuracy.
#Workers #Tasks Accuracy
Baseline 24 575 59.30%
HidIn 13 114 83.33%
CooHi 12 24 75%
CooHiSo 13 228 36.4%
CooVi 18 95 87.37%
trend. In the task of IF tasks, the longer working time leads to the lower accuracy. This happen due
to the existence of cheaters, which will be explained in the next section.
On the other hand, the TCI task is straightforward, and workers can get the answer directly
instead of needing extra time to look for information. Spending more time on TCI task will
not improve performance. That is why the diferences in the average task completion time and
performance between CooVi and Baseline are not signiicant for this task.
Key Findings. These results support our assumption that co-op reward schemes in the visible
incentive setting remove the pressure on workers to work eiciently and to complete the task
as quickly as possible to get as much reward as possible, as typically done for piecework reward
schemes. Our alternative reward mechanisms allow workers to concentrate their eforts on com-
pleting tasks efectively rather than eiciently since the distribution of rewards is a function of the
time spent completing tasks.
5.4 Does Reward-Sharing Trigger Unfair Behaviours?
On analyzing the task completion time of workers, we found that some workers took an abnormally
short or long time to complete tasks. 1’036 tasks were completed in less than one second, with a
corresponding close-to-random accuracy of 53% on average. The extremely short task completion
times could be a result of malicious activity. We can see from Table 9 that the Baseline group had
the largest number of workers with abnormally short task completion time at 24. Most importantly,
workers in the Baseline group completed 575 tasks with unusual completion time. This number was
almost six times the number of tasks completed by CooVi group workers (95 tasks). The average
accuracy rate for the corresponding tasks in the Baseline group (59.3%) was also lower than the
average accuracy rate for tasks in the CooVi group (87.37%). Furthermore, HidIn group (114 tasks)
had about ive times more tasks with less than one second completion time than CooHi group (24
tasks) had. Since the rewards in the reward-sharing approach are paid out based on the time spent,
malicious workers with a short completion time will receive only a tiny proportion of rewards.
This outcome is exactly the opposite of the purpose of the cheater as they aim to obtain substantial
inancial rewards generated by time eiciency in piecework schemes.
Another noteworthy fact is that there were fewer cheaters in groups with opaque information as
obscure information prevents them from evaluating how much money they can make. The CooHiSo
(228 tasks) group also had a higher number of tasks with cheating behaviours than the HidIn group,
and the accuracy rate of the CooHiSo group was the lowest, reaching 36.4%. The reason for this
is that, despite the opacity of the information, cheaters can still see the expected income as the
average group income is visible in the CooHiSo group. We found that on the irst day, the average
salary of the CooHiSo group was as high as $7.16 per hour, which made it attractive to cheaters.
Like quality control methods used by requesters in all crowdsourcing platforms, we simulated
the use of gold questions to identify trustworthy workers. Those who did not answer the gold
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Table 10. Share of low quality workers for diferent threshold values for gold question accuracy across the
diferent task types.
Threshold IF TCI ER TRJ RC
Baseline
70%
8.11% 2.50% 5.71% 6.25% 2.78%
CooVi 2.50% 0.00% 0.00% 3.45% 0.00%
Baseline
80%
8.11% 10.00% 5.71% 6.25% 2.78%
CooVi 2.50% 5.00% 0.00% 3.45% 0.00%
Baseline
90%
8.11% 10.00% 11.43% 12.50% 2.78%
CooVi 2.50% 5.00% 0.00% 6.90% 2.63%
question correctly and were below a certain threshold were classiied as low quality workers [15].
We chose the top 10% tasks with the highest average accuracy for each task type to be the gold
questions. Table 10 shows the relative proportions of low quality workers in the CooVi and Baseline
groups under diferent types of tasks, with 70%, 80% and 90% of accuracy thresholds, respectively.
Regardless of which threshold and task type we look at, the proportion of low quality workers in
CooVi was lower than that in Baseline. This result also proves that, as we mentioned earlier, income
sharing schemes reduce the attractiveness for cheaters.
In contrast, some workers spent an abnormally long time to complete HITs. If this happens
in co-op conditions with shared rewards, workers who took much time to accomplish a few
tasks may be classiied as slower-workers or free-riders. Slower-workers are ineicient workers
who conscientiously completed all HITs. Slower-workers are deined as having an average work
accuracy and long HIT completion time. Rockart [42] deines free-riders as people who enjoy the
beneits of commodities without contribution. In our case, free-riders are workers who leverage the
reward scheme to gain a substantial reward without earnestly completing HITs. Free-riders’ task
quality is worse than random, so they are symbolised by having lower accuracy and long average
completion time per HIT.
The presence of free-riders and slow-workers could harm the proposed reward allocationmethods
since the rewards received from the money pool is a function of the time spent on the tasks. Too
many slow workers can ultimately negatively afect the income of others. The presence of free-
riders is worse than slow-workers for the functioning of co-op schemes. Instead of sharing risks,
they increase the risk for group members as incomes are distributed without any beneit. Therefore,
we look at the presence and the efect of free-riders and slow workers on our co-op reward models.
To begin with, we look at the average HIT completion time per worker and identify free-riders
and slow-workers in the CooHi, CooHiSo and CooVi conditions. Due to diferent task-inherent
di culty levels, it is hard to ind an actual threshold value to identify what is an abnormally long
task duration. However, looking at task time distributions, slowest workers in the group can be
deined as having an average task completion time per HIT was found to be longer than two
standard deviations (2SD) away from the mean value in the ive control groups. Figure 4 represents
the accuracy and average completion time per HIT of all workers in the conditions with shared
rewards. We observed that the presence of few slow workers with normal accuracy, but we cannot
ind any evidence of the presence of free riders (i.e., bottom-right corner in Figure 4). Some workers
with low accuracy did exist, but their average HIT working duration was quite short as well and
thus it did not have a major impact on the reward of others in the group.
We found that the number of HITs inished by slow workers is only a small part of the total
number of inished HITs (30 HITs, 0.4%) and slow workers in the CooHi and CooVi spent a minor
proportion of the total time taken by all group members collectively (1.3% and 2.12%, respectively).
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Fig. 4. Accuracy with respect to the average time per HIT for each worker in shared reward conditions.
Therefore, slow workers in the HidIn and CooVi conditions produced a negligible efect on the
reward sharing scheme as the money that they received only consumed a tiny part of the group
money pool.
Key Findings.We found that when platforms provide the same transparency of information,
the reward-sharing group attracts fewer cheaters. We also found an absence of free-riding and the
inluence of slow workers on others in the group is minimal.
5.5 Post-Survey Analysis
To understand workers’ perceptions of the co-op risk-sharing and reward-sharing strategies, we
invited all participating workers to complete an optional survey at the end of the study. Workers
were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with 4 diferent statements on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1: Strongly Disagree to 5: Strongly Agree. These statements are presented
below:
• CoopSlower Ð I think that it is fair for someone slower than me in completing tasks (HITs)
to get the same payment as me in a cooperative team.
• CoopRandomÐ I would feel comfortable to be in a cooperative team where risks and rewards
are shared with random workers.
• CoopKnown Ð I would rather share risks and rewards with workers I know or workers who
I am familiar with (for example, those people I converse with on forums).
• CrowdUnion Ð A crowd workers’ union would be useful.
We collected responses from 74 diferent workers across the 5 conditions. Table 11 presents
the results from our post-study survey. We found that workers tend to agree with the idea of the
cooperative teams sharing risks and rewards (indicated by average scores > 3). Interestingly, we
found that workers were in support of sharing their rewards with slower workers in the cooperative
teams on average. This was particularly signiicant in conditions without shared rewards in the
study; more than 93% of Baseline workers (M=3.6) and 71.4% of HidIn workers (M=3.36) indicated
their support. Also, we found that workers preferred to participate in cooperative teams with
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strangers than with other familiar workers. At the � = 0.1 level of signiicance, a Wilcoxon signed-
rank test revealed a signiicant diference in this preference of workers to cooperate with strangers
(Median=4) compared to familiar workers (Median=3);� = −1.836, � = .066. Finally, the respondents
believed that a crowd workers’ union would be useful, with over 81% of workers who reported a
score of ≥ 3 on the Likert-scale. As mentioned earlier, a co-op reward scheme could also consider
a share of the total reward not to be re-distributed among members but rather to be allocated to
other mutually beneicial purposes (e.g., a union).
Table 11. Post-survey results about workers’ perspective on CrowdCOOP (average on a 1-5 scale).
Baseline HidIn CooHi CooHiSo CooVi
#Workers 15 14 9 17 19
CoopSlower 3.60 3.36 3.33 3.35 3.05
CoopRandom 3.73 3.14 4.00 3.65 3.68
CoopKnown 3.40 3.14 3.11 3.24 3.63
CrowdUnion 3.53 3.57 3.33 3.12 3.53
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Risk Mitigation Tools Versus Reward-Sharing
Some tools are already available to help workers mitigating risks by avoiding bad tasks and
requesters [35, 47]. However, utilizing such tools may lead to social divisions among workers [52]
as those workers not using the tools may end up carrying most of the risks. The number of high-
income tasks is limited, and workers who do not use risk mitigation tools see their exposure to
high-income tasks reduced. Compared to these tools, reward sharing strategies do not create social
divisions among members of the group as the proposed method encourages risk sharing rather
than risk avoidance. Workers outside the co-op group would thus not be negatively afected (other
than missing out on the risk mitigation beneit).
On the other hand, the proposed risk and reward sharing scheme encourages the coexistence with
crowd work tools. As an example, Chiang et al. [10] introduced Crowd Coach: a Chrome extension
that allows workers to provide suggestions on tasks they work on. Through these suggestions,
other workers can improve their skills. However, workers under traditional piecework reward
conditions may not be willing to provide such guidance as the time dedicated to this would be
taken away from additional HIT completion. Thus, without additional inancial incentives, it is
not likely that such peer-support approach could gain in popularity. Our proposed reward scheme
may be used to encourage workers to invest some time using mutual help tools given the shared
income pool.
6.2 Piecework Versus Reward-Sharing
Piecework is deined as workers getting a ixed rate for each performed task [1]. In piecework,
workers can achieve best performance by repeated ”learning by doing” [32]. However, in some
micro-task crowdsourcing platforms, the diversity of tasks makes it di cult for workers to maximize
their eiciency, and the high cost of learning also makes workers reluctant to try new and more
challenging tasks as it may lower their earnings [35]. By contrast, the proposed co-op reward
scheme emboldens workers to take up advanced and longer HITs by sharing with others the
associated inancial and career risks.
Besides, pieceworkmay discourageworkers from sharing their insights on eicient task execution.
If the average task completion time is reduced, requesters may reduce HIT rewards if they are set
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based on expected completion time [8]. Additionally, previous research show that proit-sharing
incentives provide an efective way to encourage cooperation between individuals and improve
efort and productivity [17]. Working in a cooperative may create an intrinsic motivation for
workers as they help each other by sharing risks. Jakob et al. showed that intrinsic motivation can
enhance labours’ data quality in crowdsourced markets [43].
6.3 Guidelines for Crowdsourcing Cooperatives
Transparency is vital when establishing cooperative platforms. Reward sharing schemes may
have no signiicant impact on the number of tasks completed by employees. Still, visible rewards
and platform transparency play a crucial role in motivating employees to complete more work.
Workers need to know how much money they can potentially earn for each task they complete and
implicitly assign a value to the efort they are investing. In the long run, the impact of information
transparency in the traditional compensation model is limited. However, information transparency
still plays an essential role in reward-sharing schemes as income self-assessment is more complex
and less obvious by design (i.e., it is not the simple sum of individual rewards).
Our post-study survey conirms that workers felt comfortable sharing risks and rewards, even in
the presence of slow workers. We found that workers preferred to participate in co-op teams with
strangers than with other familiar workers, so cooperatives may be easily formed through existing
crowdsourcing communities (e.g., online MTurk worker forums). In a production-level deployment
of the proposed approach, we envision a group of initial members to establish a collective where all
members agree and abide to the spirit of mutual help. As the reward is shared among all members,
they might all share organisation management responsibilities. Some participants may be elected
to manage some aspects of the group (e.g., performing periodic quality assessment activities to
identify free-riders) and be entitled to claim the time spent on such activities as time worth of
reward allocation.
Our indings on MTurk may also be applicable to other crowd-work platforms such as Uber,
Upwork, and TaskRabbit where cooperatives may be established independently of the platforms.
Almost all workers in the gig-economy are independent contractors, and they sufer some of the
same risks that we addressed in this work. For example, gig workers do not get any income when
they are sick as they are not completing tasks. This risk is also one that can be shared among
members of a cooperative. Workers in a co-op group may decide to allocate a part of the money
pool (e.g., 1%) before the time-based redistribution happens, and use these funds to help members
who are unable to work (akin to a sick leave).
7 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this section we discuss the limitations that may arise from running the experiments under
controlled conditions. First of all, this study did not employ quality control schemes, and all HITs
were approved and rewarded. This allowed us to track good and bad quality work in the cooperative.
Although slow workers and free-riders did not harm the cooperative group in our experiment, in a
real deployment, their presence may lead to trust-related problems among workers. The presence of
low quality workers may increase the task rejection rate and result in monetary loss for the group.
Slow workers may limit the overall productivity and thus reduce the motivation of experienced
workers. A peer-review system can be a possible strategy to control for slow workers and free-riders.
Researchers in other ields have shown that members of unions have a great aversion to free-riders
and are very active in identifying and eliminating them, even at a high cost [18]. Workers with
abnormally short or long task completion time or with high rejection rates may be selected to
go through an evaluation process led by experienced workers in the group. Detected inadequate
workers may then be shepherded to improve, punished or removed from the cooperative group.
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Another possible challenge for co-op reward schemes is the presence of workers who are multi-
tasking. That is, workers who accept multiple tasks in parallel for the fear of missing out (as by
accepting to work on a HIT, the HIT is allocated to them before the HIT batch runs out of work to
be completed) and by doing so increase the computed task completion time which would then be
used to calculate their reward. This issue could be addressed by considering the total work session
time and the completed tasks within a session rather than the individual task completion times to
re-allocate rewards as done in our experiments. Additionally, missing out on new HITs is not a risk
that decreases workers’ income under a co-op setting, as workers are paid based on the time they
spent working on HITs independently of the number of HITs completed. Thus, while tools that aim
to manage risks by estimating the HIT completion time (e.g., [45]) can be easily combined with the
proposed reward sharing schemes, they may not be serving the same risk mitigation purpose but
rather provide workers with time management functionalities (e.g., plan their work day activities).
In this experimental study, we used a ixed set of HITs available to participating workers. We
believe that our indings concerning the proposed reward distribution models will hold in a dynamic
marketplace with a continuous low of newly available HITs. This is corroborated by workers who
indicated a keen interest in participating in cooperative teams through the exit survey. Moreover,
we have not studied the impact of the co-op group size across the diferent conditions. In future
work, we will explore how team size, structure, and composition afects performances under the
proposed reward distribution models.
Another limitation of the proposed approach is that experienced workers (who are known to be
more eicient [26]) receive relatively small returns, especially for those who already know how to
manage risks and perform tasks eiciently. Some risks, such as diferent inherent task di culties
in the same batch, cannot be easily avoided and are thus better shared within cooperative groups.
However, the beneits they get from sharing risks could be lower than the beneits they get from
being experienced, and thus decide that they are better of by not participating to co-op activities.
Therefore, reward strategies that take quality control into account will be an important element
of crowd work cooperatives. One possible strategy to address this limitation is an approach were
excellent and/or experienced workers receive an extra reward, which may come from lower rewards
being allocated to slow workers or from an earmarked proportion of the money pool (see Section
6.3 where a similar approach has been suggested for sick leaves).
Some cultures believe that rest time should also be paid [34]. Research has shown that short breaks
could improve workers’ productivity and well-being [33]. Whether a short break will enhance the
performance of crowdsourcing workers is a topic worth studying on its own [11]. In future work,
we will study the impact of allowing each member of a reward sharing group to be absent for some
time and having such a break being paid using a certain percentage of the money pool.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed and experimentally evaluated novel crowdsourcing risk and reward
sharing schemes that enable crowd workers to move away from piecework payments and allow
them to focus on performing crowd work with less stress and less time pressure. Our method also
encourages workers to try diverse tasks. Even reward-motivated workers can take up challenging
and complex HITs without worrying about missing inancial rewards. To this end, we built a new
crowdsourcing platform, CrowdCO-OP, by leveraging the API provided by MTurk, that allows
us to perform controlled experiments comparing diferent reward distribution mechanisms and
task information. Our indings show that co-op reward sharing creates a win-win situation for
both workers and requesters: For workers, unrewarded activities are shared thus allowing for risk
mitigation; For requesters, our alternative reward mechanisms lead to a more productive workforce
and do not lead to lower quality data.
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